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HISTORICAL ANALYSIS IN ANTITRUST LAW*
JAMES MY**
I. INTRODUCTION
This centennial symposium fittingly highlights the long-standing,
central role of historical as well as economic analysis in the antitrust field.
Today, in the midst of continuing debate concerning the recent past and
desirable future of American antitrust law, historical perspectives
powerfully continue to affect antitrust reasoning and development at a time
when renewed historical scholarship is adding greatly to our knowledge of
the antitrust past.
In this article I would like to address four main issues: first, the uses
of history and the variety of questions posed by long-run changes in
perceptions of the public interest in antitrust law; second, the changing
pattern of scholarly writing on the antitrust past; third, the potential
benefits of expanded thinking about antitrust history in general; and fourth,
the key importance of certain long-neglected aspects of the historical
record as sources of insight into the origins, nature, and development of
American antitrust law.
11. THE USES OF HISTORY AND THE PATTERN OF PUBLIC
INTEREST THINKING IN ANTITRUST LAW
Since the first antitrust laws were passed in the late nineteenth century,
antitrust scholars, judges, and practitioners continually have turned to
history as a fundamental source of guidance, insight, and justification.
Judges and lawyers throughout this period have relied on historical
research and analysis to illuminate both original legislative intent and the
meaning of earlier case law. The Supreme Court and other courts today
frequently continue to base important antitrust opinions substantially or
even entirely on historical evidence and interpretations.! At the same time,
* Copyright by James May 1991. This article is a substantially expanded version of
remarks presented at a conference entitled Observing the Sherman Act Centennial: The Past
and Future of Antitrust As Public Interest Law, sponsored by the faculty and Law Review
of New York Law School (Nov. 16, 1990).
** Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See, e.g., California v. Am. Stores Co., 110 S. Ct 1853, 1861-66 (1990) (relying
substantially on an examination of formative era antitrust thinking and activity in holding
that Congress authorized divestiture as a remedy in private antitrust litigation challenging
mergers); Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 110 S. CL 1884, 1903 (1990)
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historical perceptions heavily continue to influence much broader debates
over basic antitrust philosophy as well.
Advocates of competing general antitrust approaches repeatedly have
appealed to the past for essential support. Very often, they particularly
have stressed historical inquiry designed to identify core goals that
appropriately and usefully might guide current antitrust policy and the
systematic, coherent development of antitrust doctrine.2 The dramatic
changes in prevailing antitrust philosophy and enforcement practice since
the 1970s' offer a striling recent example of this tendency. Scholars,
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority's decision as a violation of both original
congressional antitrust aims and longstanding perceptions of the antitrust past, declaring that
"[t]he Court, in its haste to excuse illegal behavior in the name of efficiency, has cast aside
a century of understanding that our antitrust laws are designed to safeguard more than
efficiency and consumer welfare, and that private actions not only compensate the injured,
but also deter wrongdoers" (footnotes omitted)); Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 731,731-33 (1988) (supporting pathbreaking vertical restraint decision
not only through economic analysis but also on the ground that Congress in 1890
understood that the common-law meaning of the term "restraint of trade" had changed over
time and intended to retain such a "dynamic potential" when it passed the Sherman Act;
accordingly, the Court declared, "[t]he term 'restraint of trade' in the statute, like the term
at common law, refers not to a particular list of agreements, but to a particular economic
consequence, which may be produced by quite different sorts of agreements in varying times
and circumstances"); Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 342-44 (1979) (finding
formative era legislative history supportive of consumers' right to sue for money damages
for injuries allegedly resulting from illegal price fixing); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (articulating a classic statement of the historic purpose of the Sherman
Act to buttress the Court's condemnation of a challenged tying arrangement); Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 50, 49-62 (1911) (basing seminal "rule of reason"
interpretation of the Sherman Act heavily on an examination of both "the history of the
period when [the Act] was adopted" and the history of relevant common-law development
up to the time the Act was passed); United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,
428-29 (2d Cir. 1945) (interpreting the Sherman Act's ban on monopolization in the light
of a perception that Congress historically had sought to promote both economic and
noneconomic goals); State ex rel Van de Kamp v. Texaco, Inc., 46 Cal. 3d 1147, 1153-63,
762 P.2d 385, 387-95, 252 Cal. Rptr. 221, 223-31 (1988) (rejecting the possibility of a
merger challenge under the state's antitrust statute on the basis of an extended examination
of the development of state antitrust legislation and case law around the country prior to
1907).
2. See, e.g., May, Antitrust in the Formative Era: Political and Economic Theory in
Constitutional andAntitrust Analysis, 1880-1918,50 OHio ST. L.. 257, 260,394-95 (1989)
[hereinafter May, Antitrust in the Formative Era] (discussing this tendency).
3. On the general nature and extent of these changes, see, for example, Flynn, The
Reagan Administration's Antitrust Policy, 'Original Intent" and the Legislative History of
the Sherman Act, 33 ANTITRUST BuLL. 259,262-63 (1988); Kovacic, The Antitrust Paradox
Revisited: Robert Bork and the Transformation of Modern Antitrust Policy, 36 WAYNE L.
REV. 1413, 1442-60 (1990) [hereinafter Kovacic, Antitrust Paradox Revisited]; Lande, The
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judges, and enforcement officials embracing these newer approaches
generally did not claim that in the absence of new legislation the logical
and practical virtues of these methodologies were sufficient to justify their
adoption, even if they were genuinely inconsistent with the historic inten-
tions and understandings underlying the original passage of currently
existing antitrust statutes. Accordingly, while proponents of these far-
ranging changes heavily emphasized the economic logic4 and procedural
strengths 5 of their position, they ultimately also justified these general
developments in large measure through explicit or implicit appeals to goal-
centered historical interpretations echoing the analysis offered by Professor
and later Judge Robert Bork in his landmark 1978 book The Antitrust
Paradox.6 Repeatedly, proponents asserted that Congress historically
contemplated that judicial interpretation of federal antitrust law would
evolve substantially over time with changing factual circumstances and
new economic thinking in order to carry out more effectively a
fundamental original congressional aim to advance consumer welfare
through the promotion of economic efficiency. Conversely, as
Rise and (Coming) Fall of Efficiency as the Ruler of Antitrust, 33 ANTMTRUST BULL. 429,
430-32, 435, 465 (1988) [hereinafter Lande, Rise and Fall]; Millstein & Kessler, The
Antitrust Legacy of the Reagan Administration, 33 ANTrrRUST BULL. 505, 506-07 (1988);
Pitofsky, Antitrust in the Next 100 Years, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 817, 818 (1987).
4. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POUCY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
(1978) [hereinafter R. BORK, ANTrIRUST PARADOX]; R. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN
ECONOMIC PERSPECrTvE (1976).
5. Claims of superior administrability have contributed substantially to the wide
acceptance of efficiency-centered approaches since the 1970s. See, e.g., Kovacic, Antitrust
Paradox Revisited, supra note 3, at 1439, 1451, 1462-63; Lande, Rise and Fall, supra note
3, at 436-38; Sullivan, The Viability of the Current Law on Horizontal Restraints, 75 CALiF.
L. REV. 835, 852-53 (1987).
6. R. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 4, at 15-79. On the central importance
of Judge Bork's historical analysis as a foundation for his proposals for modem antitrust
policy and practice, see, for example, Kovacic, Antitrust Paradox Revisited, supra note 3,
at 1416, 1461, 1470-71; Kovacic, Comments and Observations, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 119, 120
(1990) [hereinafter Kovacic, Comments]; Lande, Rise and Fall, supra note 3, at 432-35. On
the widespread influence of Judge Bork's historical views among other proponents of
efficiency-focused antitrust policy, see, for example, Flynn, supra note 3, at 263; Lande,
Rise and Fall, supra note 3, at 432 & n.10, 435. For an important assessment of the historic
significance and impact of The Antitrust Paradox, see Kovacic, Antitrust Paradox Revisited,
supra note 3.
7. See, e.g., R. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 4, at 20, 56-66; Baxter,
Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of
Antitrust Law, 60 TEX. L. REV. 661, 692-94, 702-03 (1982); Easterbrook, Workable Anti-
trust Policy, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1696, 1702-05 (1986). Certain other leading scholars have
posited a more open-ended congressional delegation of authority to the federal courts but
then have gone on to argue that as a matter of sound antitrust policy courts should only seek
1990]
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considerable debate over appropriate antitrust policy and goals continued,'
advocates of other approaches prominently invoked historical analysis to
challenge the soundness and legitimacy of efficiency-centered views.9
Simultaneously, these dissenting advocates offered alternative historical
interpretations in support of their own methodologies. 1"
Historical investigation not only has played a major role in influencing
specific judicial decisions and general policy debate; it also has been used
to highlight long-term patterns in antitrust thinking and activity" and
particular practical deficiencies in antitrust enforcement." Such developed
historical perspectives, in turn, have laid the foundation for commentary
warning judges and lawyers of the possible recurrence of various earlier
to promote basic economic objectives and not a broader range of "populist" goals. See 1 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND
THEIR APPLICATION II 105-113 (1978).
8. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 3, at 260-61 (noting this continuing debate).
9. See, e.g., Kovacic, Antitrust Paradox Revisited, supra note 3, at 1461-62 (noting the
centrality of historical perspectives in critiques of Judge Bork's efficiency-centered
prescriptions for antitrust law).
10. See, e.g., Arthur, Farewell to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional
Sherman Act, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 263 (1986); Flynn, supra note 3; Fox, The Battle for the
Soul of Antitrust, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 917 (1987) [hereinafter Fox, Battle]; Handler, Is
Antitrust's Centennial a Time for Obsequies or for Renewed Faith in Its National Policy?,
10 CARDOZo L. REv. 1933, 1944-46 (1989); Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and
Primary Concern ofAntitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J.
67 (1982) [hereinafter Lande, Wealth Transfers]; Sullivan, supra note 5, at 853. Indeed,
history recently has been invoked not only by advocates of competing general philosophies
of antitrust law but also by proponents of its outright elimination. See, e.g., DiLorenzo, The
Origins ofAntitrust: Rhetoric v. Reality, REGULATION, Fall 1990, at 26.
11. See, e.g., R. HOFSTADTER, What Happened to the Antitrust Movement?, in THE
PARANOID STYLE IN AMERICAN POLITICS AND OTHER ESSAYS 188 (1965); Fox & Sullivan,
Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming From? Where Are We
Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936, 937-56 (1987); Kovacic, Failed Expectations: The
Troubled Past and Uncertain Future of the Sherman Act as a Tool for Deconcentration, 74
IOWA L. REy. 1105 (1989) [hereinafter Kovacic, Failed Expectations]; Millstein & Kessler,
supra note 3, at 510-14; Peritz, A Counter-History of Antitrust Law, 1990 DUKE L.J. 263
[hereinafter Peritz, Counter-History]; Rowe, The Decline of Antitrust and the Delusions of
Models: The Faustian Pact of Law and Economics, 72 GEo. L.J. 1511 (1984).
12. See, e.g., Kovacic, Comments, supra note 6, at 119; Kovacic, Failed Expectations,
supra note 11.
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problems.'" These perspectives also have prompted important proposals
for specific improvements in antitrust enforcement.
14
Observers both within and outside of the legal profession, moreover,
often have invoked history for still further purposes less immediately
related to everyday antitrust practice. Historians and antitrust scholars com-
monly have looked to the past to clarify the place of antitrust law within
various larger contexts.15 In addition, such writers have turned to history
to illuminate the sources and magnitude of earlier changes in antitrust
activity 6 and to evaluate the long-run impact of antitrust developments
13. See, e.g., Kovacic, Failed Expectations, supra note 11 (exploring the problems with
antitrust deconcentration efforts in the past and the possibilities for their recurrence in the
future); Millstein & Kessler, supra note 3, at 512 (cautioning that "the history of antitrust
law has been riddled by the efforts of extremists on both sides of the spectrum to take
economic models" too far in substitution for individual case-by-case analysis and declaring
that '[i]t is this distortion of the valid use of economic models which has led to periodic
excesses in our antitrust policy"); Rowe, supra note 11, at 1559 (warning that general
economic models reflect the particular historical circumstances of their own time of origin
and that their continued use "distorts legal norms when conditions change").
14. See, e.g., Kovacic, Comments, supra note 6, at 119 (noting the impact of historical
perspectives in spurring federal deconcentration initiatives in the late 1960s and early 1970s
and in prompting proposals for major changes in the operations of the Federal Trade
Commission).
15. See, e.g., E. Fox & L. SULLIVAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST (1989);
E. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966); J. HURST, LAW
AND SOCIAL ORDER IN THE UNITED STATES 245-66 (1977); T. KOVALEFF, BUSINESS AND
GovERNMENT DURiNo TH EISEHOWER ADMINISTRATION: A STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST
POLICY OF THE ANTITRUST DmvSION OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (1980); W. LETWIN,
LAW AND ECONOMIC POLICY IN AMERICA: THE EVOLUTION OF THE SHERMAN ANTITRUST
ACT (1965); S. PIOTr, THE ANTI-MONOPoLY PERSUASION: POPULAR RESISTANCE TO THE
RISE OF BIo BUSINESS IN THE MIDWEST (1985); REGULATION IN PERSPECTIvE: HISTORICAL
ESSAYS (T. McCraw ed. 1981); M. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERI-
CAN CAPrrALISM, 1890-1916: THE MARKET, THE LAW, AND POLITICS (1988); H. THORELLI,
THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: ORIGINATION OF AN AMERICAN TRADITION (1955);
Brietzke, The Constitutionalization ofAntitrust: Jefferson, Madison, Hamilton, and Thomas
C. Arthur, 22 VAL. U.L. REV. 275 (1988); Kramer, The Supreme Court and Tying
Arrangements: Antitrust as History, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1013 (1985); Scherer, Efficiency,
Fairness, and the Early Contributions of Economists to the Antitrust Debate, 29 WASHBURN
L.J. 243 (1990).
16. See, e.g., J. HURST, supra note 15; M. SKLAR, supra note 15; H. THORELLI, supra
note 15; Kovacic, Failed Expectations, supra note 11. Such scholarly efforts recently have
extended to attempts to evaluate the substantiality and causes of the major changes in
antitrust thinking and activity that have occurred since the 1970s. See, e.g., Kovacic,
Antitrust Paradox Revisited, supra note 3; Lande, Rise and Fall, supra note 3; Millstein &
Kessler, supra note 3.
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on American economic," political,'8 and intellectual' 9 life more gener-
ally. Such efforts have informed assessments of both the symbolic 0 and
practical2" importance of antitrust law and have formed a basis for predic-
tions about future antitrust development.' At the same time, historical
understanding also has helped to shape the sense of role held by legal
professionals who view their activities as a continuing part of a larger
antitrust tradition.'
The title of this conference's panel on "Using Historical Analysis to
Formulate the Public Interest" highlights numerous important questions for
such continuing historical reflection. What does the historical record tell
us, for example, with regard to the continuities and discontinuities in public
interest formulations in antitrust thought since the late nineteenth century?
Why were public interest concerns for political, economic, and moral
values beyond allocative efficiency once so prominent in antitrust thinking?
Should we attribute this phenomenon to an absence of widely available,
relevant economic theory in the late nineteenth century? To a powerful,
prevailing attraction to unsystematic "populism"? Or, alternatively, to the
presence and strength of theoretical tendencies decidedly different from
those that currently are dominant?
17. See, e.g., A. CHANDLER, THE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN
AMERICAN BUSINESS 332-33 (1977); Carstensen, How to Assess the Impact of Antitrust on
the American Economy: Examining History or Theorizing?, 74 IowA L. REV. 1175 (1989);
Freyer, The Sherman Ac4 Comparative Business Structure, and the Rule of Reason: America
and Great Britain, 1880-1920,74 IOWA L. REV. 991, 991-92, 1011, 1016-17 (1989); Pratt,
The Petroleum Industry in Transition: Anti-Trust and the Decline of Monopoly Control in
Oil, 40 J. ECON. IST. 815, 831 (1980).
18. See, e.g., R. BORKC, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 4, at 10-11,425; T. Kauper,
Remarks at United States Department of Justice Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary
of the Passage of the Sherman Act, reprinted in 136 CoNG. REc. S10,141, S10,142 (daily
ed. July 20, 1990) [hereinafter T. Kauper, Remarks].
19. See, e.g., R. BORK, ANTrRUST PARADOX, supra note 4, at 10, 418, 420-22, 425.
20. See, e.g., id at 418; H. THORELLI, supra note 15, at 608; T. Kauper, Remarks,
supra note 18, at S10,142, S10,143; Kovacic, Failed Expectations, supra note 11, at 1150.
21. See, e.g., R. BORIC, ANTrRUST PARADOX, supra note 4, at 425; H. THORELLI,
supra note 15, at 604-09; Carstensen, supra note 17; T. Kauper, Remarks, supra note 18,
at S10,142.
22. See, e.g., Fox, The Future of the Per Se Rule: Two Visions at War with One
Another, 29 WASHBURN L. 200, 201 (1990); Kauper, The Justice Department and the
Antitrust Laws: Law Enforcer or Regulator?, 35 ANTITRUST BULL. 83, 120(1990); Kovacic,
Antitrust Paradox Revisited, supra note 3, at 1467; Kovacic, Failed Expectations, supra note
11, at 1139, 1144, 1150.
23. See, e.g., J. Rill, Remarks at United States Department of Justice Commemoration
of the 100th Anniversary of the Passage of the Sherman Act, reprinted in 136 CONO. REC.
S10,138, S10,139 (daily ed. July 20, 1990).
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Why did nonefficiency-focused views of the public interest become so
disfavored in antitrust law after the 1960s? Should we see this development
solely or predominantly as a testament to the intellectual power of late
twentieth century economic perspectives? To what extent might we
usefully see it as an indication of the weakness of later twentieth century
theory in general, unable to provide more compelling theoretical means to
incorporate systematically a broader range of values and concerns?
Alternatively, to what degree is it appropriate to attribute the antitrust
changes since the 1960s not to intellectual developments but instead to
particular major changes in the economic and political environment?
Historical questions of this sort currently are receiving substantially
increased consideration from historians, antitrust scholars, and
economists.' I would like to highlight certain aspects of this new writing
and then mention some of the promising possibilities for further analytical
refinement that are presently gaining greater attention from various authors
focusing on the antitrust past.
II. THE ONGOING DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOLARLY
WRITING ON ANTITRUST HISTORY
Within the antitrust field, as elsewhere, historical approaches and
interpretations have changed over time. In his monumental study published
in the mid-1950s, Hans Thorelli, for example, relied upon a broad range
of primary and secondary materials to explore numerous interrelated
developments bearing on early antitrust activity and analysis.' As a result
of these efforts, Thorelli concluded that the Sherman Act reflected a
general philosophy of "economic egalitarianism" incorporating various
major elements of nineteenth century thinking.' More specifically, he
found that in passing the Act, Congress hoped to protect not only
competition and efficiency, but also economic opportunity, wealth
distribution, and political liberty.'
In the 1970s and 1980s, antitrust scholars strongly influenced by
analytical concerns raised by modem neoclassical economic scholarship
repeatedly took a very different approach to antitrust history. In the
historical sections of his 1978 boolP and related earlier articles,29 Judge
24. See, e.g., Kovacic, Comments, supra note 6, at 120 (noting this trend); May, The
Role of the States in the First Century of the Sherman Act and the Larger Picture of
Antitrust History, 59 ANTITRUST U. 93, 94 (1990) [hereinafter May, Antitrust History]
(same).
25. See H. THoRsmn, supra note 15.
26. See id. at 564-72.
27. See id. at 225-30, 570-72.
28. R. BoRK, ANTrrRusT PARADOX, supra note 4.
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Bork, for example, looked intensively but nearly exclusively at
congressional debate materials and leading judicial opinions and proposed
a more narrowly focused interpretive thesis than had earlier commentators
on antitrust development. Strongly downplaying any influence of general
political and economic theory in early antitrust thinking, ° Judge Bork
minimized possible congressional concerns for small business opportunity
or equitable wealth distribution and instead emphasized early congressional
desires to promote economic efficiency or "consumer welfare
maximization."3
1
Today, in a new revival of writing about antitrust history, antitrust
scholars, economists, and historians are once again enlarging the focus of
historical inquiry and analysis. 2 In the last several years, numerous
scholars have explored at length various practical and intellectual aspects
of antitrust development over the last one hundred years.33 In large
measure these newly published works usefully complement one another.
At the same time, however, some significant differences of method and
perspective also recently have appeared in this growing body of historical
scholarship. Let me offer a few examples by way of illustration.
In my own recent writing on the formative era, for example, I have
tried to look broadly at the late nineteenth and early twentieth century
American context and have focused particularly on the nature and impact
of contemporary economic, political, and legal theory. In exploring both
federal and state antitrust developments, I have emphasized the continuing
29. Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON. 7
(1966); Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market
Division (pts. I & I), 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1965), 75 YALE L.. 373 (1966).
30. See May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure in the Formative Era: The
Constitutional and Conceptual Reach of State Antitrust Law, 1880-1918,135 U. PA. L. REV.
495,553-56,587-92 (1987) [hereinafter May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure] (discussing
this feature of Judge Bork's analysis).
31. See, e.g., R. BoRK, ANTrrRusT PARADOX, supra note 4, at 56-66. On the use of
the latter term, see, for example, Fox, Battle, supra note 10, at 918 & n.7; Lande, Rise and
Fall, supra note 3, at 434-35.
32. In significant part, this development has occurred in reaction to the work of Judge
Bork and other similarly minded observers. See Kovacic, Antitrust Paradox Revisited, supra
note 3, at 1469. Antitrust writers and other scholars widely have perceived serious flaws in
the historical analysis of congressional intent that has been used to support recent efficiency-
focused approaches to antitrust law. See, e.g., id. at 1461 (noting the broad scholarly
consensus on this point); see also id. at 1471 (noting that "Bork's conclusion that efficiency
guided the enactment of the antitrust laws rested substantially upon the type of 'falsely
imagined past' that he said was a major source of undue antitrust expansionism" (footnote
omitted)).
33. For a partial listing of recent works, see, for example, May, Antitrust History, supra
note 24, at 94 n.3.
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power of traditional general theory in the face of contemporary changes
eroding the older patterns of economic and political life on which those
perspectives initially were premised. 4
Simultaneously, many other authors recently have addressed key issues
of theory and practice in antitrust history in general and in the formative
era in particular. As already noted, while much valuable new work has
appeared, these studies sometimes have presented strikingly diverse
approaches and interpretations. For example, Professor Thomas Arthur, in
his extended exposition of a "statutory" approach to antitrust law, Farewell
to the Sea of Doubt: Jettisoning the Constitutional Sherman Act,35 and
Professor Martin Sklar, in his landmark book The Corporate Reconstruc-
tion of American Capitalism, 1890-1916: The Market, the Law, and
Politics,' both deem the Supreme Court's opinion in Standard Oil Co.
v. United States3 to have been a crucial turning point in antitrust history.
Professor Arthur, however, declares it to have been a crucial turn away
from the dominant mainstream of nineteenth century common law on
restraints of trade,38 while Professor Sklar finds it a crucial restoration of
such mainstream approaches after almost a decade and a half of Supreme
Court deviation under the leadership of Justice Peckham.39
Disagreement also has continued with regard to formative era
congressional thinking. Professor Robert Lande, for example, in a well-
known 1982 article dissenting from efficiency-centered views of antitrust
history, has posited a predominant congressional concern for wealth
distribution and the prevention of unfair wealth transfers.' Other writers,
however, have stressed a simultaneous, comparably important congressional
concern for other basic values and goals as well.
41
34. See May, Antitrust History, supra note 24; pday, Antitrust in the Formative Era,
supra note 2; May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 30.
35. Arthur, supra note 10.
36. M. SKLAR, supra note 15.
37. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
38. See Arthur, supra note 10, at 279-84, 298-302.
39. See M. SKLAR, supra note 15, at 127-39. This debate, of course, rests heavily on
perceptions of the nature and consistency of American common law over the course of the
nineteenth century. For a recent attempt to clarify this picture somewhat, suggesting that,
at least in the important states of New York and Missouri, the pattern of common-law
decision making was strikingly different in the 1880s than it had been for most of the
nineteenth century, see May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 311-31.
40. See Lande, Wealth Transfers, supra note 10.
41. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 3; May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2,
at 258-300; Millon, The Sherman Act and the Balance of Power, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1219
(1988) [hereinafter Millon, Balance of Power]; Peritz, The "Rule of Reason" in Antitrust
Law: Property Logic in Restraint of Competition, 40 HASTINGS L.. 285 (1989) [hereinafter
1990)
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In wide-ranging recent writing addressing both antitrust legislation and
jurisprudence, Professor Herbert Hovenkamp has de-emphasized the
continuing power of traditional classical economic perspectives in forma-
tive era antitrust thinldng and, instead, has posited a sudden, pervasive
importance of new, neoclassical theory in early antitrust analysis,42
asserting that traditional nineteenth century thinking exhibited only limited
appreciation of the nature and importance of horizontal competition.43
Professor David Millon, in his major article The Sherman Act and the
Balance of Power,4 on the other hand, has offered a quite different
picture of nineteenth century thought, focusing on republican and liberal
concerns for the threats to individual liberty posed by concentrated
economic and political power and positing that such concerns provided the
motivation for congressional passage of the Sherman Act in 1890.4"
Other scholars recently have focused on the broader sweep of antitrust
history and have offered important new assessments of the long-run
patterns and impact of antitrust activity. Professor William Kovacic, for
example, has examined at length the factors influencing the recurring rise
and fall of antitrust deconcentration efforts and the practical effects of such
initiatives.' Professor Peter Carstensen has reevaluated the historic
economic impact of antitrust developments more generally and has raised
key questions regarding the methodologies frequently employed in recent
years to make such assessments.47 At the same time, leading scholars
such as Thomas McCraw," Ellis Hawley,49 and Morton Keller"° have
Peritz, The "Rule of Reason"].
42. See Hovenkamp, The Sherman Act and the Classical Theory of Competition, 74
IOWA L. REV. 1019 (1989) [hereinafter Hovenkamp, Classical Theory]; Hovenkamp, Labor
Conspiracies in American Law, 180-1930, 66 TEX. L. REV. 919 (1988) [hereinafter
Hovenkamp, Labor Conspiracies].
43. See Hovenkamnp, Classical Theory, supra note 42, at 1027; Hovenkamp, Labor
Conspiracies, supra note 42, at 935-37, 965. Additional explorations of antitrust history by
the same author include Hovenkamp, Antitrust Policy, Federalism, and the Theory of the
Firm: An Historical Perspective, 59 ANTITRUST L.J. 75 (1990); Hovenkamp, Antitrust's
Protected Classes, 88 MlIcH. L. REv. 1 (1989); Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Movement and
the Rise of Industrial Organization, 68 TEX. L. REV. 105 (1989).
44. Millon, Balance of Power, supra note 41.
45. See id; see also Millon, The FirstAntitrust Statute, 29 WASHBURN L.J. 141 (1990).
46. See Kovacic, Failed Expectations, supra note 11.
47. See Carstensen, supra note 17.
48. See, e.g., T. MCCRAW, PROPHETS OF REGULATION (1984).
49. See, e.g., Hawley, Herbert Hoover and the Sherman Act, 1921-1933: An Early
Phase of a Continuing Issue, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1067 (1989).
50. See, e.g., M. KELE, REGULATING A NEW ECONOMY (1990).
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continued to enlarge our understanding of the relationship of antitrust
activity to broader developments in business and economic regulation.
The work of the other participants in this conference session provides
still further important examples of the variety to be found in recent
scholarship on antitrust history. Professor Sklar's previously noted 1988
book, for instance, examines extensively the ways in which turn-of-the-
century Americans came to terms with the rise of large-scale corporate
capitalism and focuses at length not only on congressional and judicial
antitrust efforts but also on the differing regulatory philosophies adopted
by Presidents Roosevelt, Taft, and Wilson respectively.51 In a series of
recent articles,52 Professor Daniel Ernst has furthered considerably our
understanding of the early legal treatment of labor. Professor Ernst's work
has explored insightfully, for example, the decline of older individualistic
conceptions of employer-employee relations and the ongoing battle of ideas
reflected in the 1914 enactment of the labor provisions of the Clayton
Act.53 Professor William LaPiana, in his article for this conference,
thoughtfully has explored the language of major early antitrust opinions,
placing them within the larger context of Progressive Era jurisprudential
philosophy.'M Professor Rudolph Peritz creatively has broken substantial
new ground in a number of related works urging that we draw insight from
the approaches of the French philosopher Michel Foucault and understand
antitrust law over the last one hundred years as the product of a continued
tension between two fundamental rhetorics of "property" and
"competition," respectively, in interaction with ongoing basic concerns for
liberty and equality.55
The diversity in this growing body of new work on antitrust history
poses important questions regarding the relative merits of various
approaches to historical interpretation and the supportability of various
historical conclusions. Such general issues of historical methodology and
51. See M. SKLAR, supra note 15.
52. See D. ERNST, THE WOODTRIM WAR: A CASE STUDY IN THE HISTORY OF LABOR
ACTIVISM, ANTITRUST LITIGATION, AND LEGAL CULTURE, 1910-1917 (Institute for Legal
Studies Working Paper No. LH2-7, 1988); Ernst, The Closed Shop, the Proprietary
Capitalist, and the Law, 1897-1915, in MASTERS TO MANAGERS 132 (S. Jacoby ed. 1991);
Ernst, The Labor Exemption, 1908-1914, 74 IOWA L. REV. 1151 (1989).
53. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 6, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 17 (1988)); Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 20, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914) (current version at 29
U.S.C. § 52 (1988)).
54. See LaPiana, The Legal Culture of the Formative Period in Sherman Act
Jurisprudence, 35 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 827 (1990).
55. See Peritz, Counter-History, supra note 11; Peritz, A Genealogy of Vertical
Restraints Doctrine, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 511 (1989); Peritz, The "Rule ofReason", supra note
41.
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analysis have been much more extensively discussed outside of the
antitrust field than within it and long have been central in professional his-
torical scholarship. As a result, expanded consideration of the methods and
insights of professional historians can contribute greatly to the ongoing
efforts to develop historical thinking further within the antitrust field itself.
IV. ANTITRUST LAW AND THE LARGER REALM
OF HISTORICAL SCHOLARSHIP
Antitrust law always has drawn upon perspectives and knowledge from
outside of the legal profession itself&6 In recent years, antitrust observers
have paid heightened attention to the principles, knowledge, and methods
of professional economists in an effort to render economic analysis in
antitrust law more sophisticated and supportable. 7 Despite substantial
continued reliance on historical as well as economic analysis, however,
antitrust scholars, judges, and practitioners generally have not paid similar
attention to the parallel benefits to be gained from increased sensitivity to
the logical principles, detailed knowledge, and methodological concerns of
professional historians. As a result, antitrust scholars and practitioners
frequently have foregone valuable opportunities for more effective
realization of the full benefits of historical study.
Careful historical research and analysis can help to free us from
erroneous conceptions of the past, which can seriously limit and distort our
thinking.s8 As the historian Stephen Vaughn, for example, has cautioned
in his instructive anthology, The Vital Past: Writings on the Uses of
History:59 "We do not have to believe Santayana when he said that those
56. Understandings of American history and of general political and economic theory
repeatedly informed the enactment, enforcement, and interpretation of antitrust legislation
throughout the formative era, as well as in later decades. See May, Antitrust in the
Formative Era, supra note 2; see also Hovenkamp, Classical Theory, supra note 42; May,
Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 30, at 541-93; Millon, Balance of Power,
supra note 41; Peritz, The 'Rule of Reason", supra note 41.
57. See, e.g., Lande, Rise and Fall, supra note 3, at 444, 457; Millstein & Kessler,
supra note 3, at 506, 524, 525, 528, 531, 538; R. Schrnalensee, Remarks at United States
Department of Justice Commemoration of the 100th Anniversary of the Passage of the
Sherman Act, reprinted in 136 CONG. REC. S10,143 (daily ed. July 20, 1990); see also
ANTrrRusT POUCY IN TRANsMoN: TuE CONVERGENCE OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (E. Fox
& J. Halverson eds. 1984); R. BLAIR & D. KASERmAN, ANTITRUST ECONOMICS (1985);
ECONOMIC ANALYsIs AND ANTITRUST LAW Cr. Calvani & J. Siegfried 2d ed. 1988); H.
HOvENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTTRUST LAW (1985).
58. See, e.g., R. BORK, ANTITRUST PARADOX, supra note 4, at 15; Butterfield, The
Dangers of History, in THE VITAL PAST: WRITINGS ON THE USES OF HISTORY 224, 226,
228-30 (S. Vaughn ed. 1985).
59. TiE VITAL PAST, supra note 58.
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who fail to remember the past are doomed to repeat it. Still, those who do
not remember are in jeopardy of suffering at the hands of those who say
they do."60
Improved historical study not only can further clarify specific
legislative, judicial, and executive-branch understandings and activities
during earlier decades, but it also can shed additional light on the broader
social and intellectual meaning of antitrust developments more generally.
Judge Bork, for example, strikingly affirmed the widely accepted
importance of such broader historical perspectives in his 1978 book on
antitrust law.6 In that work, Judge Bork declared that antitrust develop-
ments should be evaluated not only as law, but also as economics and as
politics,62 and he emphasized that antitrust thinking should be understood
as an important, special "subeategory of ideology"63 exercising a "unique
symbolic and educative influence over public attitudes toward free markets
and capitalism."" Judge Bork noted that antitrust usefully can be viewed
as a microcosm reflecting and reinforcing larger intellectual movements in
American life.' In this connection, he particularly stressed the need to
understand the interrelationship between long-run developments in antitrust
thought and broader trends in American thinking about four fundamental
issues: the appropriate roles of courts and legislatures, the legitimate extent
of government involvement in economic life, the emphasis to be placed on
general social welfare versus special interest protection, and the
interpretation to be given to the general ideals of liberty and equality."
Expanded investigation and analysis of such historic interrelationships
can provide substantial new insights into antitrust-related experience and
can help to ensure that modem antitrust thinking is respectable not only as
law, economics, and politics,' but as history as well. Intensified scholarly
efforts of this sort can help us to see more accurately the diversity as well
as the conmonalities present in the thought and activity of particular prior
time periods. They also can help us to appreciate more fully the extent and
sources of both continuities and discontinuities in antitrust experience over
the course of the Sherman Act's first century.
60. Vaughn, History: Is It Relevant?, in THE VrrAL PAST, supra note 58, at 1, 11.
61. R. BORK, ANrTrRUST PARADOX, supra note 4.
62. See id. at 418.
63. Id. at 3, 10.
64. Id. at 425.
65. See id. at 10.
66. See id. at 10-11, 418-25.
67. See generally id. at 418 (expressing concern that in substantial degree antitrust law
by the 1970s had become "no longer intellectually respectable" as law, as economics, or as
politics).
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The focused methodological sensitivities of professional historians can
provide helpful practical guidance for antitrust analysts' own thinking
about the past. Such understandings can warn us, for example, of the
numerous ways that historical as well as economic analysis can be flawed
by various forms of oversimplification.' Such methodological
perspectives also can make us more aware of the ways in which an
excessive preoccupation with current concerns, perspectives, and values can
severely limit and distort historical understanding.69 Increased attention
to the technfiques of careful, more thorough historical analysis not only can
help us to steer clear of misleading "reductionism" and "presentism";70
it also can help us to avoid the danger of becoming overwhelmed,
conversely, by the perceived complexity of the past." In so doing, it can
help us to avoid the unwarranted view that if the past cannot be reduced
to a single, narrowly reductionist meaning, it should be viewed as funda-
mentally indeterminate, with all interpretations being equally possible, so
that in effect history is taken to offer little or no identifiable meaning at all
for modem practice and thinking.
Modem scholarship focused specifically on legal history, which has
grown dramatically in recent decades,72 offers particularly valuable
insights. This scholarship, for example, usefully has highlighted key ways
in which the general approaches to historical analysis taken by lawyers
have tended to differ from those adopted by historians73 and has clarified
68. See, e.g., D. FISCHER, HISTORIANS' FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL
THOUGHT (1970).
69. See, e.g., id at 314-15; Dozer, History as Force, in THE VITAL PAST, supra note
58, at 276.
70. See generally D. FISCHER, supra note 68, at 172-75 (discussing the reductive
fallacy), 135-40 (discussing the fallacy of presentism). For an extended discussion of such
problems in leading antitrust works addressing the legislative history of the Sherman Act,
see Flynn, supra note 3.
71. As historian Michael Kammen, for example, has noted, while one of the benefits
of history is "[t]o enhance our awareness of the complexity of historical causation-the
unanticipated intertwining of opinion and events," it is also "the historian's vocation to
provide society with a discriminating memory," so that one can "avoid the tendency to
ascribe equal value to all relationships and events. Worse than no memory at all is the
undiscriminating memory that cannot differentiate between important and inconsequential
experiences." Kammen, On Knowing the Past, in THE VITAL PAST, supra note 58, at 55,
57.
72. See, e.g., K. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY at vii
(1989); THE LITERATURE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY (W. Nelson & J. Reid eds. 1985);
Friedman, American Legal History: Past and Present, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 563 (1984).
73. See, e.g., THE LITERATuRE OF AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY, supra note 72, at 28,
32, 38, 185, 235, 242.
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the analytical limitations of much of "lawyers' legal history."' Legal
history writing in recent decades also has greatly expanded our knowledge
of the nature, development, and impact of law in general during historical
periods of intense interest to antitrust observers, and consideration of this
body of knowledge can add immensely to the depth, sophistication, and
supportability of our interpretations of the antitrust past.75
Finally, I would like to suggest that we can garner especially great
rewards by focusing on developments in one field of law in particular
outside the antitrust realm. As I previously have emphasized elsewhere,"
the field of law that I have in mind is that of constitutional law.
V. ILLUMINATION FROM CONSTITUTIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENTS
From the middle of the nineteenth century to the First World War,
Americans experienced a series of dramatic developments that repeatedly
focused attention on the fundamentals of American political, economic, and
social life. A bloody civil war successfully preserved the union itself and
freed black Americans from the bonds of slavery, paving the way for
Reconstruction Era efforts to secure these achievements through new
constitutional amendments and civil rights legislation.7 In subsequent
decades, geographic markets expanded and American firms increasingly
took advantage of the greater economies of scale made possible by the
74. Id at 235, 269, 273. On this point, see especially Gordon, Historicism in Legal
Scholarship, 90 YALE U. 1017 (1981); Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing
of American Legal History, 17 AM. . LEGAL HIST. 275 (1973).
75. Leading scholars such as Michael Les Benedict and Charles McCurdy, for example,
have contributed greatly to a substantially revised understanding of the nature of laissez-faire
constitutional jurisprudence in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a new
understanding which offers considerable rewards for scholars and lawyers interested in a
better appreciation of the more general legal and intellectual climate of opinion out of which
antitrust law first arose. See, e.g., Benedict, Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of
the Meaning and Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 3 LAW & HIST. REV. 293
(1985); McCurdy, Justice Field and the Jurisprudence of Government-Business Relations:
Some Parameters of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism, 1863-1897, 61 . AM. HIsT. 970
(1975). For an example of a recent effort to extend this constitutional-history scholarship
and relate it to an expanded understanding of early antitrust history, see May, Antitrust in
the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 262-88. Conversely, scholars primarily interested in
aspects of legal history outside the antitrust field potentially can benefit substantially from
increased consideration of antitrust-history scholarship.
76. See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2; May, Antitrust History,
supra note 24. The following section is based heavily on the much more extended
discussion of early antitrust law set out in the former of these works. The points made here
are explored in much greater detail in that longer article.
77. See generally E. FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMEICA'S UNF ISHED REVOLUTION
1863-1877 (1988); L MCPHERSON, BATrLE CRY OF FREEDOM: THE CIVIL WAR ERA (1988).
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numerous technological innovations of the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries. These changes reduced costs and boosted productivity but also
generated repeated crises of overcapacity that intensified competitive
struggles and losses in many industries. These developments, in turn,
spurred an increasing recourse to various forms of loose and tighter busi-
ness combinations as American businesses widely sought greater security
and more favorable returns.78 In the decades immediately preceding the
First World War, large-scale corporate capitalism rapidly displaced the
familiar patterns of a more decentralized, smaller-business economy79
while conflict between labor and business prominently continued" and
state and federal regulation increased substantially."
Americans understood and responded to these major developments in
varied ways.' In large measure, however, legislators, judges, and other
observers tended to formulate and apply their diverse approaches within a
broadly shared general frame of reference that incorporated certain basic
perspectives on politics, economics, and judicial methodology.83
Americans heavily influenced by nineteenth century liberal political
and economic perspectives believed that the health of American political
and economic life critically depended upon protection of the fundamental,
interrelated rights of labor, property, and exchange. When these rights were
duly safeguarded, it was thought, natural processes would tend to maximize
the benefits gained by both individuals and society at large and, indeed,
simultaneously would tend to ensure economic opportunity, efficiency,
prosperity, distributional justice, social harmony, and political freedom.'
Protection of these fundamental rights of labor, property, and exchange was
a chief concern of Reconstruction Era congressmen" and became a
78. See, e.g., T. MCCRAw, supra note 48, at 65-73; H. THORELLI, supra note 15, at 63-
85.
79. See M. SKLAR, supra note 15, passim.
80. See, e.g., M. KELLER, AFFAIRS OF STATE: PUBIsC LIFE IN LATE NINMTEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA 188-91, 394-95 (1977).
81. See, e.g., L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 439-63 (2d ed. 1985).
82. See, e.g., May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 281-87 (surveying
these varied responses).
83. See id. at 258-88, 391-92.
84. See id. at 269-81.
85. See id. at 288-89. On congressional reconstruction efforts, see, for example, H.
BELz, EMANCIPATION AND EQUAL RIGHTS: POLTICS AND CONSTTUTIONALISM IN THE CIVIL
WAR ERA 47-150 (1978); M. CURTIS, No STATE SHALL ABRIDOE: THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1986); E. FONER, supra note 77, at 228-80; H.
HYMAN & W. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT
1835-1875, at 295-303, 309-13, 386-426, 439-72 (1982); E. MALTZ, CIVIL RIGHTS, THE
CONSTITUTION, AND CONGRESS, 1863-1869 (1990); W. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH
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central preoccupation of both state court judges and the Justices of the
United States Supreme Court as they elaborated the laissez-faire consti-
tutional jurisprudence of the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries.'
Today, antitrust scholars and lawyers perceive constitutional law and
antitrust law as quite separate and sharply distinct fields of analysis. s7 As
I have sought to suggest at length elsewhere,8 however, Progressive Era
Americans perceived a very different relationship between these two bodies
of law. For a great many Americans of those years, antitrust law seemed
the essential logical complement to laissez-faire constitutionalism. While
the latter sought to protect the key rights of labor, property, and exchange
from the potential threats posed by the leading governmental innovations
of the era, the former sought to protect these same core rights from the
threats thought to be posed by the most profoundly disturbing private
innovations of the time. 9
As a result of this complementarity, close examination of constitutional
developments from the Civil War to the First World War powerfully
illuminates the theoretical foundations not only of contemporary
constitutional thinking but also of early antitrust analysis as well. Such a
focus clarifies, for example, contemporary Americans' own understandings
of the full significance and interrelation of economic opportunity,
efficiency, competition, fair distribution, and political liberty and their view
of the crucial proper roles of courts and legislatures.' ° Close attention to
constitutional developments and contemporary theory also helps us to
appreciate more fully why nineteenth century congressmen did not feel a
greater need to resolve the tensions that later observers increasingly would
perceive among the multiple values implicated in section one of the
AMENDMENT: FROM PoLrrIcAL fRtNCIPLE TO JuDiCIAL DOCTRNE 1-147 (1988).
86. See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 262-69, 275-81. On
laissez-faire constitutional jurisprudence, see also, for example, Benedict, supra note 75;
Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379
(1988); Jones, Thomas M. Cooley and 'Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism": A
Reconsideration, 53 J. AM. HIsT. 751 (1967); McCurdy, supra note 75; Urofsky, State
Courts and Protective Legislation During the Progressive Era: A Reevaluation, 72 J. AM.
HIST. 63 (1985).
87. See, e.g., Fox, The Politics of Law and Economics in Judicial Decision Making:
Antitrust as a Window, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 554, 555 (1986).
88. See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2.
89. See id. at 258-88.
90. See id. at 258-300.
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fourteenth amendment9' and among the various concerns implicated in
section one and section two of the Sherman Act, 2 enacted less than a
quarter-century later.
Focusing on the late nineteenth and early twentieth century importance
of the basic rights of labor, property, and exchange in both constitutional
and antitrust analysis also clarifies the adaptability and continuing power
of such general perspectives in a period of dramatic economic and political
change.93 Simultaneous scrutiny of both constitutional and antitrust
tbinking sheds especially great light on the adaptation and modification of
general theory in formative era antitrust jurisprudence. As I have tried to
suggest elsewhere in detail, such a dual focus strikingly reveals, in
particular, how the same basic theoretical perspectives heavily influenced
both the constitutional and antitrust analyses of the three leading architects
of early Sherman Act jurisprudence--Justice Rufus Peckham, Justice
Edward Douglass White, and Judge William Howard Taft.9'
Understanding the nature and interrelation of constitutional and
antitrust thinking in late nineteenth and early twentieth century America
also allows us to see more clearly the magnitude and significance of the
changes that have occurred in both constitutional jurisprudence and
antitrust analysis over the course of the twentieth century. This long-run
history helps to explain further why the Supreme Court and other observers
repeatedly asserted parallels between the two fields over the last one
hundred years." Simultaneously, it also helps to explain why such asser-
tions and the Supreme Court's renewed emphasis on individual rights in
both civil rights and antitrust cases in the 1960s became increasingly
problematic for antitrust analysts operating in an intellectual context
91. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. For a discussion of the incomplete resolution of
these tensions, see, for example, W. NELSON, supra note 85, at 7-8, 79-81, 85-90, 110-47
(exploring the reasons why congressmen in 1866 did not more fully resolve the potential
tensions present in their simultaneous concerns to safeguard equal protection of the law,
absolute rights, and largely traditional patterns of federalism).
92. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, §§ 1-8, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1988)). For an analysis of congressional treatment of these concerns, see
May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 288-300 (exploring the reasons why
congressmen in 1890 did not more fully resolve the potential tensions posed by their
simultaneous concerns for economic opportunity, efficiency, competition, fair distribution,
and political liberty).
93. See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 281-300; May, Antitrust
Practice and Procedure, supra note 30, at 561-71.
94. See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 300-09.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972);
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933); May, Antitrust in
the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 392.
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differing greatly from the general theoretical environment of the
Progressive Era.9
Increased consideration of general theory in that formative period of
American antitrust law, moreover, illuminates the reasons why advocates
of differing fundamental goals for modem antitrust law readily have been
able to find some historical support for each of their divergent positions.
It also suggests how the recurring lack of consideration of early general
theory in modem antitrust scholarship has impeded the more adequate
resolution of these debates.'
Finally, simultaneous scrutiny of both constitutional and antitrust
thought in the decades from the Civil War to the First World War allows
us more fully to address parallel issues regarding the interaction of legal
theory and history in these two fields today. Greater appreciation of the
similarities and interconnections between the theoretical understandings and
purposes underlying congressional promulgation of the Reconstruction Era
constitutional amendments and civil rights legislation on the one hand and
congressional passage of the Sherman Act on the other, for example, poses
more sharply questions regarding the meaning and merits of various
"original intent" or "original understanding" approaches to constitutional
and antitrust law, respectively.
For instance, as Professor Millon recently has stressed,9" along with
Professor John Flynr 9 and others,1" one of the most striking aspects
of Judge Bork's influential writing has been his insistence upon a
nonevolutionary "original intent" or "original understanding" approach to
constitutional analysis at the same time that he simultaneously has
embraced a strongly evolutionary methodology for antitrust
jurisprudence."' Recognition of the substantial interrelationship and
96. See May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 391-94.
97. See id. at 260, 394-95. On the frequent scholarly disregard or minimization of the
influence of general theory in formative era antitrust thinking, see, for example, id. at 259-
60; May, Antitrust Practice and Procedure, supra note 30, at 553-61, 589 & n.466.
98. See Millon, Balance of Power, supra note 41, at 1290-92.
99. See, e.g., Flynn, supra note 3, at 271.
100. See, e.g., Boyle, A Process of Denial: Bork and Post-Modern Conservatism, 3
YALE .L. & HuMANSIs 263, 278-81 (1991); Lande, Rise and Fall, supra note 3, at 451
n.8; May, Antitrust History, supra note 24, at 97; Sullivan, supra note 5, at 852 n.76.
101. Compare, e.g., R. BORK, THE TEMPTNG OF AMERiCA: THE POITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAw 5, 218 (1990) [hereinafter R. BORK, TEMPTING OF AMERiCA] (stating that
interpretation and application of any constitutional or statutory provision should be
constrained by the meaning of the provision's wording as it was generally understood at the
time it was adopted) with R. BORK, ANTITrRUST PARADOX, supra note 4 (urging that modem
Sherman Act jurisprudence should evolve in accordance with modem microeconomic
thinking).
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similarity between late nineteenth century constitutional and antitrust
thinking offers us a valuable opportunity to evaluate further the consistency
of such a stance and the possible difficulties with original intent or original
understanding methodologies more generally in each of these two
fields. 102
To what extent does solid historical scholarship, for instance, support
the view that Congress clearly contemplated and intended a substantial
evolution of jurisprudence under the general nineteenth century language
of the Sherman Act, to take account of new factual contexts and changing
economic thinking, but that Congress neither contemplated nor intended a
similarly substantial evolution ofjurisprudence under the general nineteenth
century language of section one of the fourteenth amendment, to take
account of new factual settings and changing civil rights thinking? If we
are to look either to the original thinking of congressmen themselves or
instead to more broadly prevailing contemporary understandings of the
meaning of constitutional and statutory provisions at the time they were
adopted, at what point is doctrinal development to be deemed no longer the
mere elaboration of originally understood purposes and theoretical
principles but instead the adoption of significantly altered goals and
differing theoretical precepts?
To what extent does historical study reveal a genuine original
consensus either within or outside of Congress concerning the meaning of
particular broad constitutional or antitrust provisions, and what was the
level of generality at which any partial or general consensus operated? To
what degree do modem constitutional or antitrust analysts ahistorically
continue to seek the original resolution of specific legal issues that earlier
actors simply never resolved themselves? °3 To what extent does the
magnitude of change over time in general intellectual and practical contexts
make it impossible now to adopt a current jurisprudence fully incorporating
basic original understandings?"°4
102. On original intent and original understanding approaches in general, see, for
example, R. BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987); R. BORK, TEMPTING
OF AMERICA, supra note 101; L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS'
CONSTITUTION (1988); Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent: The
Recent Past, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 235 (1989); Boyle, supra note 100; Brest, The Misconceived
Questfor the Original Understanding, 60 B.U.L. REv. 204 (1980); Monaghan, Stare Decisis
and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988); Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885 (1985); Presser, The Original
Misunderstanding: The English, the Americans, and the Dialectic of Federalist
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 84 Nw. U.L. REV. 106 (1990).
103. See, e.g., W. NELSON, supra note 85, at 6.
104. See, e.g., May, Antitrust in the Formative Era, supra note 2, at 395; Millon,
Balance of Power, supra note 41, at 1291.
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A clearer, more integrated picture of nineteenth and early twentieth
century constitutional and antitrust thought and a better understanding of
the change over time in both constitutional and antitrust jurisprudence can
further substantially the consideration of such general issues and usefully
can help us to assess the compatibility and limitations of original intent or
original understanding methodologies in the constitutional and antitrust
fields.
VI. CONCLUSION
Historical analysis remains a vibrant and essential component of
antitrust thinking and activity as the Sherman Act enters its second century.
The current renewal of antitrust history scholarship offers us valuable
opportunities to refine our approaches to historical analysis and to deepen
our understanding of the antitrust past. This ongoing process of refinement
and increasing illumination can be greatly enriched by continued, more
systematic consideration of the developed knowledge and methods of
professional historians. Expanded historical research and analysis
potentially can provide especially valuable insights if antitrust observers
focus on key aspects of the historical record that too often have been
underemphasized in recent years. In this connection, the parallels and
interrelations between constitutional and antitrust law in the formative era
and in the years since offer a particularly promising field of study still
awaiting further exploration by scholars and lawyers interested in the
meaning of the antitrust past.
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